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ABSTRACT 
The literature regarding consumer demand for safer food in developing countries is scant, and the general 
assumption is that these consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP, as an indicator of their demand) is 
constrained by their low ability to pay (ATP). There are, however, a number of developing countries with 
growing middle-income populations whose ATP has been steadily increasing, although low food safety 
standards in these countries still prevail. In this paper, we argue that ATP, while necessary, is not the sole 
condition for WTP and that credible information about and certification of food safety are required to 
ensure that ATP translates into WTP. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a randomized market 
experiment in two branches of a supermarket chain in Mumbai, India, a city that hosts one of the world’s 
fastest growing middle-income populations. In this experiment, we sold grapes with credible food safety 
certification labels and the exact same grapes (a placebo) without such labels. We provided all consumers 
with extensive food safety information comprising banners and posters announcing the sale of food-
safety-certified grapes in the supermarket. We also randomly selected one-half of the consumers and 
provided them with intensive information (a short documentation flier) describing what credible 
certification of food safety entails. By continuously varying the prices (with the labeled grapes priced 
higher than unlabeled ones) during the month in which the experiment was implemented, we found that 
those consumers who received intensive information (the treatment group) are more likely to purchase 
grapes labeled as certified. This result is robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of controls (income, 
gender, and education) gathered through a structured survey instrument implemented following the 
purchase of the grapes. To further investigate the marginal impact of credible information on consumer 
demand for food safety, we studied consumers’ answers to various knowledge, attitude, perception, and 
practice (KAPP) questions also collected through the survey instrument. Using KAPP responses, we 
created a consumer-specific food safety consciousness index (FSCI) and stratified consumers according to 
those below and those above the sample mean FSCI. We find that the marginal impact of credible 
information and certification on the purchase of labeled grapes is significantly greater for consumers with 
higher FSCI. We therefore conclude that credible information and certification are important determinants 
of consumer demand for food safety. 
Keywords:  randomized market experiment, food safety, willingness to pay, credible information, 
certification, knowledge, attitude and perceptions, factor analysis  
  vi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to thank Bhushana Karandikar for her excellent management of the market experiment, 
Sophanrao Kanchan, the manager of Mahagrapes, for providing us with the certified grapes used in this 
study, and the professors and students of the Chetana’s Institute of Management and Research for their 
hard work in the implementation of the market experiment and collection of the data. We would also like 
to thank Ramon Lopez, Mohammad Amin, Katharina Deffner, Dorene Asare-Marfo, and the participants 
of the IFPRI Markets, Trade and Institutions Division Brownbag series and of the Economics of 
Improved Food Safety Practices Conference sponsored by the Agricultural and Applied Economics 
Association, NEC-63, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Economic Research Service for their 
valuable comments and suggestions. The views expressed here are those of the authors, and the authors 
are solely responsible for any errors or omissions.  
  1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Consumer demand in developed countries for safer
1
The number of studies investigating consumer demand for safer food in developing countries is 
smaller, but is increasing. These studies have mainly used stated preference methods (see Krishna and 
Qaim 2008; Ehmke et al. 2008; Roy et al. 2010) and have found that in hypothetical settings, much like 
their developed country counterparts, developing country consumers also demand safer food. In addition 
to these stated preference studies, Masters and Sanogo (2002) conducted a field experiment and found 
significant demand for safer food.  However, the foodstuff used in this study (baby food) is of a special 
category of consumption; hence the results are not generalizable to all food products. Therefore, even 
though there is some evidence of demand for safer and higher quality food in developing countries, it is 
based on a few stated preference studies that are often criticized for the hypothetical biases they may 
entail (Diamond and Hausman 1994). Consequently, it is often assumed that demand for safer food is low 
in developing countries. 
 food, as measured by consumers’ willingness to pay 
(WTP) higher prices for safer food products, has been documented by several studies (see Hoffman et al. 
1993; Fox et al. 1998; Hayes et al. 1995; Roosen et al. 1998; Blend and van Ravenswaay 1999; Teisl et 
al. 1999; Loureiro et al. 2002; Lusk et al. 2003; Enneking 2004; Scarpa and Del Giudice 2004; Carlsson 
et al. 2005; Scarpa et al. 2005; Lagerkvist et al. 2006; Loureiro et al. 2006; Loureiro and Umberger 2006; 
Goldberg and Roosen 2007; Annett et al. 2008; Marette et al. 2008). These studies used various 
preference elicitation methods, including stated preference methods (choice experiment and contingent 
valuation) and revealed preference methods (hedonic pricing), as well as experimental economics 
methods (both field and laboratory experiments). In general, these studies’ findings reveal that consumers 
in developed countries are willing to pay higher prices for safer and higher quality food; their demand for 
food safety also increases as factors such as income, education, and food safety awareness levels increase, 
as well as when the level of information provided to the consumer about health risks and food safety 
issues increases.  
Several potential factors justify this assumption, the most acknowledged one being low ability to 
pay (ATP) among consumers in developing countries (Delgado 2005). ATP is a necessary condition for 
demand for safer food, but in our opinion, ATP alone does not sufficiently account for WTP. An 
increasing number of developing countries, such as China and India, have an ever-growing middle-
income population whose demand and hence WTP for higher quality consumption goods are rapidly 
increasing (Ernst and Young 2006; McKinsey Global Institute 2007). Even in these countries, ATP does 
not always translate to WTP, as the insufficient price premiums for safer food and the uniformly low food 
safety standards can attest. In this paper, we argue that one reason ATP is often not captured through 
WTP is the mere fact that there are information asymmetries regarding the safety of the food product. We 
argue that the lack of credible information about what food safety entails and whether or not a foodstuff is 
safe are important determinants of consumer demand for safer food. Our aim is not to estimate 
consumers’ WTP for safer food per se, but rather to demonstrate that when information asymmetries 
about food safety are removed or reduced, developing country consumers may demand safer products 
even if they are offered at a higher price. In other words, in this context it is important to distinguish the 
magnitude of the possible premium from the possibility of a premium itself. ATP may be an indicator of 
the size of the premium, but credible information is likely to capture both ATP and WTP.  
To test this hypothesis, we conducted a randomized market experiment in two supermarkets in 
Mumbai, the capital of the Indian state of Maharashtra. One of these supermarkets is located in an upper-
middle-income neighborhood (shop 1); the other (shop 2) is located in a lower-middle-income 
neighborhood. Shop 1 is larger, with a wider and more high-end (including imported) selection of food 
                                                       
1 Note that in this paper we use the narrow definition of food safety as stated in Ritson and Mai 1998. Under this narrow 
definition, food safety is defined as the reduction in the probability of suffering from an illness as a result of consuming food that 
may result in health risks (for example, mad cow disease, growth hormones, general health risks from foodborne illnesses, or use 
of pesticides or other chemicals).  
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and other household items, as well as modern facilities such as an electronic cash register. Shop 2 sells 
more domestic products, has fewer alternatives, and has a manual cash register. Our aim in choosing these 
two supermarkets, whose clientele who are bound to have different income levels, was to test whether 
consumers with higher income and its correlates (for example, education) would reveal significantly 
higher demand for safer food. Finally, both of these supermarkets have a geographic monopoly within 
their localities, since it is generally costly (in terms of transportation and time) for consumers to visit 
other supermarkets.  
In this market experiment, we provided customers of both supermarkets with grapes procured 
from GlobalGAP (Global Good Agricultural Practices [GAP], formerly EurepGAP)-certified grape 
producers who produce for the export market. We artificially created two kinds of grapes by separating 
the procured grapes into one group that had the GlobalGAP certification label and another group that did 
not have the label (in fact, all grapes used in this experiment were GlobalGAP certified). Therefore, the 
two groups of grapes were perfectly identical in all of their attributes (variety, texture, color, and 
freshness) and differed only in that one had a label indicating that it had a credible food safety 
certification awarded by a trustworthy third party. The experiment lasted for one month because the fresh 
grape season in the state of Maharashtra lasts for about that time period (from the end of February to the 
end of March).  
During the course of the month, we varied the price of these two kinds of grapes continuously—
with the labeled grapes always being priced higher— to avoid any price specificity in the outcomes. The 
prices were varied randomly, though within a well-calculated profitable margin so that the participating 
supermarkets did not incur any financial losses in the form of negative profits (budget deficit). Customers 
were presented with two types of information regarding the labeled grapes, which we call extensive 
information and intensive information. Extensive information included banners and posters displayed 
visibly outside and inside the supermarkets, as well as above the shelves where the labeled grapes were 
located, to inform the consumers that GlobalGAP-certified fresh grapes were being sold at the 
supermarket during the grape season. Intensive information (allocated randomly) consisted of a brief 
document (a user-friendly flier) that introduced GlobalGAP and explained what the certification entails in 
terms of production, postharvest, and handling standards. Every second customer that entered the 
supermarket during the course of the experiment was selected to be presented with the document on 
GlobalGAP certification. In this experiment, those customers who received the intensive information and 
purchased grapes of either kind (labeled or unlabeled) comprise the treatment group, whereas those who 
did not receive the intensive information and purchased grapes of either kind comprise the control group. 
Following checkout, all customers who purchased grapes during that shopping trip were interviewed; the 
overall sample size was 907 customers.  
We found that customers in the treatment group were significantly more likely to purchase 
certified grapes. In other words, intensive information about credible certification and safety guarantees 
increased consumer demand for safer food. This result is robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of 
controls (income, gender, and education) gathered through the survey instrument. Being in the treatment 
group, however, could not necessarily ensure the uniformity of treatment for all customers who received 
information. The importance of the information to customers’ purchasing decisions could differ among 
customers either because of prior knowledge or because of self-selection (in other words, choosing to read 
the document or having a better understanding of the information). To address this problem, based on 
answers to the detailed knowledge, attitude, perceptions, and practices (KAPP) data collected through the 
onsite survey, we first constructed a food safety consciousness index (FSCI) for each consumer. We then 
stratified the sample into high and low food-safety-conscious consumers.  
A priori, the marginal value of information can be expected to be higher for consumers with low 
food safety consciousness if FSCI is related to lack of information. However, we found that the marginal 
impact of being in the treatment group (having access to the intensive information document) is higher for 
consumers with higher food safety consciousness prior to the study. This result indicates that there is a 
potentially significant role for credible information and certification in capturing the demand for food 
safety in some developing countries. Further, it can be concluded that even if consumer ATP increases,  
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the lack of credible information and certification prevalent in developing countries can be expected to 
hinder the demand for and supply of safer food in these countries.  
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical model that 
explains the behavioral response of consumers to different types of information that varies by the prior 
KAPP of the consumers and the credibility of the information provided. Section 3 introduces the 
experimental design and Section 4 presents the results and discusses the caveats. Section 5 concludes the 
paper with a summary of the experiment and its main findings.  
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2.  THEORETICAL MODEL  
2.1. Willingness to Pay for Certification  
Our theoretical model follows the framework laid out in Hamilton et al. 2003. Let the individual 
preferences be summarized in an indirect utility function that has the following arguments: prices, 
incomes, and expected health. The main role of certification is to change the value of expected health. 
The expected health can differ across certified and noncertified products and across consumers, leading to 
different WTP for certified food. The certified product is offered for sale at a premium. In what follows, 
these notations will be used: 
𝐻𝑖= expected health of consumer 𝑖 
𝑝𝑖= price of the certifiable product faced by consumer 𝑖1F
2  
 𝑠 = price of the other good 
 𝑀𝑖 = income of consumer 𝑖.  
Hence, for consumer 𝑖, the augmented (with the expected health variable) indirect utility function 
is specified as 
𝑉𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖(𝑝,𝑠,𝑀𝑖,𝐻𝑖).    (1) 
The indirect utility function in equation (1) satisfies the standard properties in its 
arguments (𝑝,𝑠,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑖). Hence, 𝑉 𝑝 ≤ 0,𝑉 𝑠 ≤ 0,and 𝑉𝑀 ≥ 0. With the expected health as an additional 
argument in the indirect utility function, the partial derivative with respect to expected health is assumed 
to be positive; that is, 𝑉𝐻 > 0. Further, 𝑉 is assumed to be continuous, differentiable, and quasi convex in 
prices. Assuming 𝑠 to be the numeraire, the indirect utility function is specified only as a function of 
𝑝,𝑀,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐻. The underlying direct utility function that produces an indirect utility function as specified 
in equation (1) is presented in the appendix.  
Consider the case when a certified product is made available. Let the maximum premium that 
consumer 𝑖 is willing to pay for certified product be given by ∆𝑝𝑖
∗. Note that ∆𝑝𝑖
∗ is not the actual 
premium of the certified product in the market, which could be different. We denote the actual premium 
in the market by ∆𝑝𝑖. Clearly, if ∆𝑝𝑖 < ∆𝑝𝑖
∗ then the 𝑖𝑡ℎ consumer will purchase the certified product. This 
can be easily seen by comparing the utility level associated with the certified product with the utility from 
consumption of a noncertified product (see proof in appendix). 
Following Hamilton et al. (2003), the maximum premium that consumer 𝑖 is willing to pay (∆𝑝𝑖
∗) 




𝑖 �,   (2) 
where 𝐻𝑐
𝑖 and 𝐻𝑛𝑐
𝑖  denote the expected health of consumer 𝑖 from the certified and noncertified product, 
respectively. 





∆𝐻𝑖.  (3) 
In equation (3), the WTP depends on the perceived change in health ∆𝐻𝑖 from consuming the 
certified product. The scale factor contains the marginal utility of income in the denominator (𝑉 𝑝); hence, 
∆𝑝𝑖
∗ is expressed in monetary units as opposed to utility units. If 𝑉𝐻 > 0, for each consumer 𝑖, since 
indirect utility is non-increasing in prices, 𝑉 𝑝 ≤ 0, as  ∆𝑝𝑖
∗ is positive. 
                                                       
2 We introduce a notation for consumer specificity in price faced due to the design of the experiment, in which prices varied 
every day and subsequently varied across consumers.   
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Comparing across two consumers (1 and 2) with the same expected health gain from certification, 
∆𝑝1 
∗ > ∆𝑝2 








2 ,  (4) 
where 𝑉𝐻 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉 𝑝 are the partial derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to expected health 
and the price for consumers 1 and 2, respectively. The maximum premium that any individual is willing 
to pay does depend on the income level of the consumers (as the derivatives 𝑉𝐻 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉 𝑝 are a function of 
income levels) and on the expected improvement in health from choosing the certified product.  
Assuming higher marginal disutility of price increase for poorer consumers, if marginal utility of 
expected health is valued equally by rich and poor consumers, then wealthier consumers will have a 
greater WTP for the certified product. Note that the kind of product we are dealing with has in general a 
more pronounced effect on long-term health as opposed to short-term health. To the extent that the poor 
have higher discount rates, the marginal valuation of long-term health would be lower. If between rich 
and poor consumers, the marginal valuation of long-term health is higher for richer people, then a 
relatively higher premium can be expected from richer consumers on this ground as well. 
The change in premiums with rising incomes depends on some conditions of the utility function. 
Assuming increasing marginal utility of health with incomes, the premium increases if income elasticity 
of demand is sufficiently high (that is, greater than the coefficient of relative risk aversion). Please see 
appendix for proof.  
2.2. Role of Information, Credibility, and Willingness to Pay a Premium  
For simplicity, assume that there are two possible states of health: high state, denoted by𝐻ℎ, and low 
state, denoted by 𝐻𝑙. Let 𝜋𝑐
𝑖 and 𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝑖  denote the subjective probability (posterior probabilities following 
our information treatment) that consumer 𝑖 attaches to a product delivering high health for the certified 
and noncertified variants, respectively. We will see that, depending on the type of information, the values 
of these probabilities can vary. 
With the two possible states of health, the expected health from the certified product (𝐻𝑐
𝑖) and 
from noncertified product (𝐻𝑛𝑐
𝑖 ) is given as: 
𝐻𝑐
𝑖 = 𝜋𝑐
𝑖𝐻ℎ + (1 − 𝜋𝑐




𝑖 𝐻ℎ + (1 − 𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝑖 )𝐻𝑙,  (6) 
respectively, where it is assumed that 𝜋𝑐
𝑖 ≥ 𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝑖  ∀𝑖—that is, all individuals believe that the certified 
product has at least as high a probability of delivering high health as the noncertified one.  
Definition 1: An improved credibility of certification for individual 𝑖 implies a higher 𝜋𝑐
𝑖. 
Alternatively, more credibility implies a higher value of (𝜋𝑐
𝑖 − 𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝑖 ). We refer to (𝜋𝑐
𝑖 − 𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝑖 ) as the 
credibility gap.  
2.2.1. Role of Extensive and Intensive Information in Affecting Demand for Certified Product 
Versus Noncertified Product  
The change in expected health from a certified product over a noncertified one for individual 𝑖 is given as 
∆𝐻𝑖 = �𝜋𝑐
𝑖𝐻ℎ + �1 − 𝜋𝑐
𝑖�𝐻𝑙� − [𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝑖 𝐻ℎ + �1 − 𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝑖 �𝐻𝑙]  (7) 
In equation (7), the expected health gap can be rewritten as 
∆𝐻𝑖 = �𝜋𝑐
𝑖−𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝑖 ][𝐻ℎ − 𝐻𝑙�.   (7a)  
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The term in the first parenthesis is the credibility gap as defined above. The term in the second 
parenthesis in equation (7a) depicts the health gap. We postulate that both terms are a function of the 
information available to the consumer and thus can be altered through an information intervention. Let us 
denote the credibility gap for individual 𝑖 by 𝐶𝐶𝑖 and the health gap by ℎ. Note that without loss of 
generality, we are treating the health gap as invariant across consumers.  
Clearly, (𝜕∆𝑝𝑖
∗/𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑖) > 0, following 
𝜕∆𝐻𝑖
𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑖
> 0∀𝑖. Hence, for each consumer, if the credibility of 
the certification goes up, a larger maximum premium is possible. Similarly,  (𝜕∆𝑝𝑖
∗/𝜕ℎ) > 0.  The 
extensive information treatment is postulated to affect ∆𝐻𝑖 only through changes in 𝜋𝑐
𝑖, where consumers 
get to know that the product is certified from an international agency and are likely to assign a higher 
probability to delivery of good health (that is, 𝐻ℎ).  
The sizes of the credibility gap and the health gap are crucial to consumer choice between 
certified and noncertified products. First, let us focus on the credibility gap. It depends on 𝜋𝑐
𝑖 and 𝜋𝑖
𝑛𝑐 . 
How these posterior probabilities are formed (postinformation intervention) is critical to the effect that the 
intervention has on consumer choice between certified and noncertified grapes. With extensive and 
intensive information, we postulate a Bayesian update of the individual’s prior belief that the product will 
contribute to better health. The specific form of Bayesian updating that we consider follows from Lybbert 
et al. (2007), who characterize the updating rules in the form given in equation (8) below.  
In its most general form, Bayesian updating rules involve the ratio of a joint probability that two 
events occur and the unconditional probability that one of the events occurs. Below is a special case of the 
Bayesian updating rule. Let us denote the signals (from information treatment) that could lead to updating 
represented by 𝜋𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝑘  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜋𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝑘  respectively.  𝑘 denotes the type of signal emanating from extensive or 
intensive information. 𝑘 = 𝐸 and 𝑘 = 𝐼 imply extensive and intensive information, respectively. 
𝜋𝑖
𝑐(𝑘) = 𝗿𝑖
𝑘𝜋𝑖 + (1 − 𝗿𝑖
𝑘)𝜋𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝑘 .  (8) 





𝑘 ].   (8a) 





𝑘 ].  (8b) 
In equation (8), 𝜋𝑖
𝑐(𝑘) is the posterior probability for consumer 𝑖 about certified food delivering 
high health. (1 − 𝗿𝑖
𝑘) is the updating weight on the signal 𝜋𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝑘 . Note that the updating weight depends 
on the individual. (1 − 𝗿𝑖
𝑘) is the updating weight and is a function of the credibility of the signal. In 
general, we postulate that the credibility of the signal is a function both of the type of signal and of 
individual characteristics. Thus,  
𝗿𝑖
𝑘 = 𝗿𝑖
𝑘(𝑘,𝑋𝑖),  (9) 
where 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of characteristics for individual 𝑖. Equations (8a) and (8b) imply that the more 
“surprise” in the signal, the higher the updating. With the characterizations in (8a), (8b), and (9), 
heterogeneity is likely in the effect of different signals (label and information on availability of certified 
grapes) and documentation on consumers.  
𝜋𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝑘  denotes the signal under treatment 𝑘 about noncertified product delivering high health. 
Further, note that without extensive or intensive information, the same prior probability for delivering 
high health exists for products of either type.  
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The posterior probability from extensive or intensive information treatment depends on the 
following points. 
1.  The consumer 𝑖 has (𝗿𝑖) confidence in his prior beliefs.  If (𝗿𝑖) equals 1, then the consumer 
has full faith in his prior belief and there is no updating from the signals provided regardless 
of the information given. 
2.  The greater the confidence in the signal (the certification label, information provided, or 
both), the greater the updating of the beliefs. 
3.  The bigger the surprise in the message (the difference between the prior belief and the 
signal), the greater the updating of the beliefs. 
Extensive Information  
The extensive information provided to consumers included banners and posters inside and outside the 
supermarkets.  These informed consumers that a product certified by a third-party international agency 
was being sold at the supermarket.  This information can be modeled as providing a positive signal about 
the certified product—and only the certified product. For simplicity, assume 
𝜋𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝐸 = 𝜋 + 𝜃.  (10) 
Hence, under extensive information treatment, the following conditions hold (suppressing the 𝑖 
subscript from here on): 
𝜋𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝐸 > 𝜋 ⇒ 𝜋𝑐 > 𝜋   Condition (A) 
𝜋𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝐸 = 𝜋 ⇒ 𝜋𝑛𝑐 = 𝜋             
The credibility gap can then be written as 
𝐶𝐶𝐸 = (1 − 𝗿)𝜃    (11) 
The expected health gap under extensive information can be expressed as 
∆𝐻𝐸 = (1 − 𝗿)𝜃ℎ,  (12) 
where ℎ denotes the health gap. Few straightforward points emerge from equation (12). Unless there is 
new positive information (𝜃 > 0) and the consumer puts some weight on the new signal (𝗿 < 1), no 
premium is possible (from equation 3), as the perceived improvement in health from the certified product 
equals zero.  
In the first type of information intervention (with extensive information), the effect comes, if at 
all, from changes in 𝜋𝑐
𝑖. Note that we are also keeping the health gap fixed in this scenario. Let us denote 
the credibility gap and health gap with the extensive information as 𝐶𝐶𝑖
𝐸 and ℎℎ𝐸, respectively.  
The following statement describes the characteristics of extensive information. 
Statement 1: With extensive information, the health gap between certified and noncertified 
product is unaffected. The credibility gap is affected through changes in the probability of the certified 
product delivering a state of high health. The expected health gap that determines the size of maximum 
premium possible for any consumer is affected through this channel only.  
Proof: This follows from the definition of extensive information above.  
Intensive Information   
Intensive information was in the form of fliers which explained what the certification entailed.  This kind 
of information can have an effect not only on 𝜋𝑐
𝑖 but also on 𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝑖 . Also, the economic value of high health  
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𝐻ℎ and low health 𝐻𝑙 can be revised with the provision of intensive information. The basis for this 
characterization of the intensive information treatment will become clear with the details regarding 
documentation provided in the next section. Hence, overall, the intensive information intervention via the 
provision of information on salient features of certification works on two fronts: 
1.  Changing the credibility gap between the certified and noncertified product (𝜋𝑐
𝑖 − 𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝑖 ).  
2.  Changing the health gap (𝐻ℎ − 𝐻𝑙) . 
The credibility gap itself is impacted more because with intensive information, there can be 
Bayesian updating of the probability of food safety being delivered by the noncertified product as well. 
Further, it is possible that, following access to information, the state of low health is believed to be lower 
than 𝐻𝑙 (high health could possibly be believed to be higher than 𝐻ℎ, but we rule out that possibility).  
The counterpart of Condition (A) in this case is as follows: 
𝜋𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝐼 > 𝜋𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝐸 > 𝜋 ⇒ 𝜋𝑐 ≫ 𝜋   Condition (B) 
𝜋𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝐼 < 𝜋 ⇒ 𝜋𝑛𝑐 < 𝜋             
Let us denote the credibility gap under intensive information treatment as 𝐶𝐶𝐼. Comparing 
Condition (A) and Condition (B) implies that 𝐶𝐶𝑖
𝐼 ≥ 𝐶𝐶𝑖
𝐸∀𝑖. Moreover, knowledge about the essential 
requirements of certification can lead consumers to assign a lower value to 𝐻𝑙. Denoting the health gap 
with intensive information as ℎ𝐼 implies that ℎ𝐼 > ℎ𝐸 is possible. Combining the two implies  
∆𝐻𝐼 ≥ ∆𝐻𝐸∀𝑖,   (13) 
which translates into  
∆𝑝𝑖
∗𝐼 ≥ ∆𝑝𝑖
∗𝐸∀𝑖,                                            (14) 
where ∆𝑝𝑖
∗𝐼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝑝𝑖
∗𝐸 denote the maximum premium possible for the certified product under extensive 
and intensive information, respectively.  
It should be noted that there is an important difference in the size of the premium between the two 
information types. ∆𝑝𝑖
∗ depends not only on the expected health gap but also on the size of partial 
derivatives 𝑉𝐻 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉 𝑝, estimated at the point of indifference represented in equation (2). The arguments in 
the function on the right-hand side of equation (2) remain unchanged under extensive information. Under 
intensive information, the expected health variable on the right-hand side of equation (2) takes on a lower 
value. Thus, 𝑉𝐻 would take a higher value if there is diminishing marginal value of health. From equation 
(3), ∆𝑝𝑖
∗ will be higher on account of this effect as well if ℎ𝐼 > ℎ𝐸 holds. 
2.3. Link to the Empirical Analysis  
Empirically, what we observe is a binary decision by the consumer (that is, whether or not to buy the 
product labeled as certified). Based on the foregoing theoretical analysis, provision of information can 
lead consumers to choose the labeled product over the unlabeled product (believed to be noncertified) 
under certain conditions.  
Assume that each consumer buys one unit of either labeled or unlabeled product. Facing an actual 
price premium ∆𝑝, the decision made by individuals is binary and can be represented by the following 
simple characterization.  
Let 𝑑𝑖 = 1 denote the outcome when the individual 𝑖 buys the labeled product and 𝑑𝑖 = 0 denote 
the outcome when the individual 𝑖 does not buy labeled food. Then the outcomes for consumer 𝑖 follow 
these simple rules: 
𝑑𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 ∆𝐻𝐼 ≥ ∆𝐻𝖤 �����  and   (15) 
    𝑑𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑓 ∆𝐻𝐼 < ∆𝐻𝖤 �����,    
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where ∆𝐻𝖤 ����� is the change in expected health from labels/certification, such that ∆𝑝𝑖
∗ = ∆𝑝𝑖.  
Empirically, whether 𝑑𝑖 = 1 or 𝑑𝑖 = 0 depends on the following (which lead to the empirical 
analysis): 
1.  Type of information provided (extensive or intensive) 
2.  Effect of the information provided that depends on  
a. the signal relative to the prior beliefs of the consumers, 
b. the credibility of the signal from information provided, and 
c. updating based on the signal. 
The effect of the information treatment does depend on the type of signals as well as on 
individual consumer characteristics. The reduced form of the decision to buy the product labeled as 
certified over the unlabeled product (a binary decision) is given as  
  𝐶𝑖 = 𝗼 + 𝗽 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝗾 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,   (16) 
where dependent variable 𝐶𝑖 is binary and equals 1 if consumer 𝑖 bought the labeled product and equals 0 
otherwise, 𝐷𝑖 is a binary variable that equals 1 if the consumer was provided intensive information and 
equals 0 if not, and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector which includes not only the relative price of the labeled to the unlabeled 
product at the time of purchase but also consumer and household characteristics that have an effect on the 
decision to buy the labeled product.  
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3.  THE MARKET EXPERIMENT 
3.1. Components of the Experiment  
This market experiment has three components that require detailed explanation. These include the food 
product of focus (grapes), the variation of the price, and the GlobalGAP certification. 
3.1.1. Grapes 
Grapes were deemed to be a suitable product for analysis of food safety issues for several reasons. Grapes 
are consumed raw and consequently carry several food safety risks, including biological and chemical 
contamination. The greatest risk of biological contamination occurs during the harvest and packing 
processes. Irrigation water, if of low quality, can be a source of pathogens and could result in biological 
contamination. Further risks are associated with chemical hazards (through the inappropriate use of 
fertilizers and pesticides) pertaining to the production of fresh grapes. Furthermore, fresh grapes are a 
fruit commonly consumed during the season in which the study was implemented (the end of February 
and entire month of March). Finally, the state of Maharashtra, where Mumbai is located, is an exporter of 
GlobalGAP-certified grapes to European supermarkets; therefore, we could procure GlobalGAP-certified 
grapes from nearby suppliers (within a 200 kilometers radius) for use in the market experiment presented 
here. 
In this market experiment, we procured fresh grapes daily from the GlobalGAP exporters, 
transported them, and stored them in two Mumbai supermarkets (if the stock was not sold during that 
day) in accordance with the GlobalGAP standards. All of the grapes sold during the course of the 
experiment were GlobalGAP certified; however, only half were labeled as GlobalGAP certified and were 
placed on shelves that contained a banner indicating that they were certified grapes. The other half did not 
have any label and were placed on shelves without a banner; hence, to the customer, this second group 
was not GlobalGAP certified. Apart from the GlobalGAP certification label, the two groups of grapes 
were perfectly identical in their other attributes (color, variety, freshness, packaging, and texture). 
Because all of the grapes were sold in punnets, it was not possible for the consumer to check the taste 
(sweetness), as may be the case with grapes that are sold loose. During the course of the experiment, no 
other types of grapes were sold in the two supermarkets. 
The perception of food safety is dependent on the information given to consumers. A product 
such as fresh grapes does not have search qualities with respect to food safety (meaning qualities that 
reveal the product’s food safety attributes before purchase) nor does it have experience qualities (meaning 
those that reveal the product’s food safety attributes immediately upon consumption). The critical role of 
credible information emerges because consumers can never fully evaluate food safety prior to purchase or 
even immediately after consumption. Thus, credible information gives the product food safety credence 
attributes. Credence attributes result in problems of adverse selection owing to asymmetric information 
between buyers and sellers, where the seller knows the quality and safety of the product but the buyer 
does not. In such a situation, a credible certification label signals higher food safety and can result in 
greater WTP for the labeled product.  
3.1.2. Prices 
As mentioned in the introduction, the prices of the labeled and unlabeled grapes were varied continuously 
to preclude the possibility that the results applied only to a particular set of absolute or relative prices of 
labeled and unlabeled grapes, respectively. Evidence shows that consumers often take price as a signal of 
better quality. If this effect works, then purchase behavior toward labeled grapes could be biased when the 
relative price is higher for labeled grapes. Hence, the incremental value of information could be more 
important when the relative price is low.  
Prices of the labeled and unlabeled grapes were varied every two to three days, with the 
restriction that the labeled grapes were always offered at a premium. The prices were varied based on the  
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total sales in the previous two or three days (depending on whether the revision occurred after two days or 
after three days). A set menu of higher or lower prices (depending on the situation) was offered to the 
supermarkets. These set prices were such that price variation did not result in any losses to the 
participating supermarkets. The experiment presented here is a true market experiment as opposed to a 
field experiment; that is, prices were realistic and within a profitable margin for the supermarkets. The 
prices used in the intervention are presented in Table A.1 in the appendix.  
3.1.3. Certification  
In this study, we chose GlobalGAP as the third-party certification authority. Before September 2007, 
GlobalGAP was EurepGAP (European retailers’ protocol for Good Agricultural Practice), which was 
founded in 1996 by a group of 11 British and Dutch retailers with the objective of creating a single 
private-sector standard for fresh fruits and vegetables. The GlobalGAP standard covers all aspects of 
production (summarized in Box 1) with a checklist of 49 major control points, 99 minor control points, 
and 66 recommendations. To obtain certification, the producer must obey all applicable major control 
points, 95 percent of the applicable minor control points at the time of the audit, and 100 percent of 
applicable minor control points within one month of completion of the audit (Chia-Hui Lee 2006).  
GlobalGAP is deemed to be one of the most credible agencies currently existing in the world. 
This agency was chosen not only because of its extensive production and processing requirements but 
also because of our assumption that Indian consumers are more likely to trust an international third-party 
body, as opposed to a national body, for food safety standards and certification. This assumption is based 
on our review of the literature and on interviews with relevant stakeholders (consumers, traders, and 
farmers), which highlighted that food safety law and its enforcement are weak in India, as is also evident 
from the various recent food safety scandals (for example, contaminated bottled drinking water and soft 
drinks and high heavy-metal content in vegetables) (Marshall et al. 2003; Mathur et al. 2003; CSE 2004; 
Johnson et al. 2006). 
Box 1. GlobalGAP production, postharvest, and handling requirements 
 
 
   
•    •  GlobalGAP is a private-sector body that sets voluntary standards for the certification of 
agricultural products around the globe.  
•  GlobalGAP requires that all products are traceable to the farms where they were produced.  
•  GlobalGAP requires that use of seed treatments is justified and approved. 
•  GlobalGAP requires that all fertilizer use be recorded. Fertilizers must be kept in a clean place 
to avoid contamination. Use of fertilizer over the limit of internationally accepted best practice 
is prohibited. 
•  GlobalGAP mandates that sewage is never used as manure. 
•  GlobalGAP requires strict maximum residue limits in pesticides. Pesticides can be sprayed 
only by technically qualified people. Farmers must keep records of all pesticide use. 
•  GlobalGAP requires that while harvesting, workers must have access to a clean toilet in the 
vicinity. Workers must be aware of hygiene requirements and diseases that make them unfit to 
handle harvests. 
•  GlobalGAP requires that packaging must be stored in a clean environment to avoid 
contamination by pests, rodents, birds, and chemicals. Reusable crates must be cleaned 
thoroughly to ensure that there is no contamination that may be detrimental to the product or 
consumer health. 
Source: GlobalGAP, available at http://www.globalgap.org/cms.  
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3.2. Experimental Design and Protocol 
During the implementation period, grapes were procured daily from GlobalGAP-certified producers in 
two districts (Pune and Sangli). The producers were paid the price they would have received in the export 
markets.  In the two supermarkets, identical labeled and unlabeled grapes were shelved next to each other. 
Both groups of grapes were packaged in half-kilogram punnets, as is standard in Indian supermarkets. 
One group of grapes carried the GlobalGAP certification label; the other group (the placebo) contained 
identical grapes in identical packaging but without any labels. As explained previously, the prices of 
labeled and unlabeled grapes were varied consistently, with the restrictions that the labeled product 
always had a premium over the unlabeled one and that the prices were set within a profitable margin to 
cover all procurement, transportation, and storage costs.  
All consumers who entered the supermarkets were provided with extensive information regarding 
the availability of GlobalGAP-certified grapes. This extensive information consisted of posters that were 
hung at both the outside and inside entrances, as well as above the shelves containing the GlobalGAP-
certification labeled grapes. Further, every second customer (about one-half of the customers) who 
entered the supermarkets during the course of the experiment was randomly selected to be presented with 
the intensive information document. This document was a one-page, glossy documentation flier (see 
Figure A.1 in the appendix) explaining that GlobalGAP is a credible certification agency, as well as what 
this certification entails. The document was brief and highlighted only the main restrictions that 
GlobalGAP imposes on production, postharvest, and handling processes. The definition of GlobalGAP 
certification and what it entails was written based on interviews with farmers, supermarket managers, and 
food safety experts in India. Further, prior to the implementation of the experiment, focus group 
discussions were carried out with supermarket customers to keep the wording of the documentation as 
simple and approachable as possible. Given the multilingual context, the documentation was prepared in 
three languages—English, Hindi, and Marathi. Consumers were asked about their language preferences 
before being given the document.  
Following checkout, customers who had purchased grapes were interviewed with a survey 
instrument, regardless of which kind of grapes they had purchased and whether or not they were given the 
intensive information document. In this experiment, customers who i) saw the extensive information 
(banners and posters), ii) received the intensive information document (the flier about GlobalGAP 
certification and what it entails), iii) bought grapes of either type, and iv) were interviewed with the 
survey instrument comprise the treatment group The control group consists of those customers who i) saw 
only the extensive information, ii) bought grapes of either type, and iii) were interviewed with the survey 
instrument.  Every effort was made to interview all customers who purchased grapes during the course of 
the experiment. In total, 907 consumers were interviewed with a survey instrument that lasted about 30 
minutes. The survey included questions on household- and respondent-level demographic, social, and 
economic characteristics, consumers’ KAPP regarding food safety and quality, and a hypothetical choice 
experiment implemented to estimate the values consumers derive from various safety and quality 
attributes (taste, GlobalGAP certification, organic production, and local production) See Box A.1 in the 
appendix for details of the choice experiment study.  
As explained in the introduction, the two supermarkets have different clientele (shop 1 catering to 
an upper-middle-income group and shop 2 to a lower-middle-income group). Additionally, both of these 
supermarkets are geographical monopolies within their neighborhoods (in the organized retail segment), 
as there are no other supermarkets in these neighborhoods and as it is too costly (in terms of cost of 
transportation and opportunity cost of time spent in Mumbai’s traffic) for consumers to visit supermarkets 
in neighboring localities.  
In total, 24 enumerators and two field supervisors were trained during a four-day workshop, 
which included two days of pretesting at the supermarkets. Enumerators were all postgraduate (Master’s)-
level marketing research students and the two field supervisors were their professors. Every workday was 
split into three shifts: morning to midday, midday to afternoon, and afternoon to evening. During the first 
two shifts, one enumerator was responsible for handing out the flier to every second customer that entered  
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the supermarkets, while two enumerators were responsible for interviewing those customers who had 
purchased grapes. Supermarket cashiers were responsible for informing every customer who had 
purchased grapes that there was a survey in which they could participate after checkout; in addition, 
enumerators were also responsible for stopping every customer after checkout to ask them if they had just 
purchased grapes and, if so, whether they would like to participate in a survey. During the last shift 
(afternoon to evening) and the weekend shifts, when the supermarkets were significantly more crowded, 
the number of enumerators at both ends was doubled.  
The two field supervisors, as well as the manager of the experiment, monitored the enumerators 
daily to ensure that the enumerators i) continuously and randomly handed out the fliers to the customers 
as they entered the supermarkets, ii) did not talk customers into buying labeled grapes or in any way 
“market” the labeled grapes, iii) made every effort to interview as many of the grape purchasers as 
possible following checkout, and iv) checked the receipts of the respondents to record the quantity of 
grapes they purchased (by weight in kilograms) and the amount of money they spent on the grapes.  
Eighty percent of the customers who bought grapes during the course of the experiment were 
interviewed with the survey instrument. The high response rate may be attributable to three factors. First, 
respondents seemed to value contributing to the study as it was part of students’ vocational training in 
their marketing course. Second, we endeavored to create an environment conducive to onsite 
interviewing. Comfortable seats and cold soft drinks were provided and customers were given a small gift 
(an incense holder) at the end of the survey in appreciation of their time. Third, we conducted the survey 
with personal digital assistants (PDAs), which are handheld computers programmed to ensure efficiency 
and speed of data collection and to minimize any data collection and entry errors that may arise in 
conventional pen-and-paper interviews (see Caeyers et al. (2010) for a comparison of pen-and-paper 
interviewing to computer-assisted personal interviewing). Consumers were intrigued by this computer-
assisted data collection method, which increased their willingness to participate in the survey.  
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4.  RESULTS  
4.1. Summary Statistics for the Control and Treatment Groups  
Comparison of the social, economic, and demographic characteristics of the clientele of the two 
supermarkets revealed that, as expected, shop 1 customers have significantly higher income and education 
levels compared with their counterparts who patronize shop 2 (see Roy et al. 2010). Within each 
supermarket, the key social, economic, and demographic characteristics that we hypothesize to have 
significant impacts on consumer demand for safer and higher quality food were compared across 
treatment and control groups.  
In shop 1, several of the key characteristics (age, education, and share of income spent on food) 
expected to affect demand for food safety are significantly different across the treatment and control 
groups. Though this difference might be a coincidence, it is also possible that there was self-selection 
among treatment group customers in regard to being interviewed, since customers with higher food safety 
consciousness might have better understood the document and been more likely to participate in the 
survey.  
In shop 2, however, the randomization procedure worked, meaning the key characteristics were 
similar across the two groups. In the following sections, we present the results from the 336 grape-
purchasing customers interviewed at shop 2. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for key household 
characteristics, including age, education, gender, income, expenditure on food, and distance to the 
supermarket. Even though every second customer (about one-half of the customers) was selected to 
receive the intensive information (the flier), the sample sizes of the two groups do not reflect this because 
not everyone who was presented with the flier purchased grapes and not everyone who had purchased 
grapes could be interviewed after checkout.  
As can be seen from Table 1, the two groups (control and treatment) are similar in terms of 
important characteristics. Although they are located in the lower-middle-income neighborhood, 
consumers in our sample have higher incomes, have smaller families, and are more likely to hold at least 
a university degree compared with the Mumbai average (Census of India 2001). This profile of middle-
income households is in line with the argument that middle-income households, which are increasing in 
number, are the likely clients of organized retail. The time it takes to get to the supermarket (less than half 
an hour on average and statistically insignificantly different across the two groups) reveals that the 
customers are located relatively near the supermarket (or at a convenient distance). This finding confirms 
our initial assertion that the supermarket may have a geographical monopoly within its locality.  
Among the consumers who bought grapes and participated in the survey, 82.4 percent bought 
labeled grapes during the course of the experiment. According to the Pearson chi-square test results, 
consumers in the treatment group were significantly more likely to purchase grapes labeled with a food 
safety certification, compared with their counterparts in the control group at less than 1 percent 
significance level. Almost three-quarters of the control group consumers, however, bought labeled grapes, 
even though they were provided only with the extensive information on the banners and posters stating 
the availability of GlobalGAP-certified grapes in the store and not with the intensive information fliers.  
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Table 1. Characteristics of control and treatment groups at shop 2  






groups  Characteristics  Mean (standard deviation) 
Age   46.07 (12.99)  47.03 (13.12)  45.67 (12.72)  NS
a 
Household size  3.77 (1.49)  3.86 (1.44)  3.66 (1.53)  NS 




39.57 (17.15)  39.08 (17.84)  NS 







Distance to the supermarket (in minutes)  24.3 (22.9)  24.6 (26.2)  22.4 (17)  NS 
  Percentage   
Gender = 1 if male, 0 otherwise  63.82%  65.07%  63.16%  NS 
Education = 1 if university degree or 
above, 0 otherwise 
70.59%  69.86%  71.05%  NS 
Total number of consumers  336  146  190  NA
b 
Bought certified grapes = 1, 0 otherwise  82.35%  74.66%  88.95%  *** 
Source:  Certification Market Experiment, Mumbai 2008.  
Notes:
 aNS: nonsignificant; 
bNA: nonapplicable; *** pairwise Pearson chi-square test significantly different at 1% significance 
level.  
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the share of sales of labeled to unlabeled grapes and the 
relative price of these two groups of grapes. As can be seen from this figure, there is no consistent pattern. 
Had the relationship been downward sloping, it could have implied that the relative price could play some 
role in revealing quality of, and hence demand for, labeled grapes.  
Figure 1. Relative sales of labeled to unlabeled grapes and the relative price of labeled grapes  
 
Source: Certification Market Experiment, Mumbai 2008.   
4.2. Consumers’ Knowledge, Attitudes, Perceptions, and Practices regarding Food Safety  
As explained previously, consumers in the treatment group received detailed information regarding what 
the food safety certification entails. Through this randomized provision of intensive information, we tried 
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the supermarket during the course of the experiment. The treatment (the provision of intensive 
information), however, is not expected to have a uniform effect on all consumers in the treatment group. 
We hypothesize that consumers will “digest” or perceive the information provided differently because of 
their prior KAPP about food safety. 
To test this hypothesis, we constructed a consumer-specific index on food safety consciousness 
based on a factor analysis of consumers’ answers to the 13 KAPP questions included in the survey 
instrument (Table 2). These questions were developed in consultation with supermarket managers and 
farmers and based on focus group discussions with supermarket customers. Twelve of these questions 
were coded according to a five-point Likert scale; one was a ranking question that was coded as binary 
options. The factor analysis was done using the principal factor extraction method. Factors with an 
eigenvalue above one were retained. Varimax rotation suggested the existence of one factor. Loadings 
above 0.40 were considered as factoring together. The factor was named Food Safety Consciousness on 
the basis of the variables that factored together as well as the relative magnitude of the factor loadings in 
absolute terms. The Food Safety Consciousness Index (FSCI) was calculated for each consumer based on 
his or her answers to the KAPP questions. Higher values of this index indicate a greater level of food 
safety consciousness prior to the experiment. One caveat that should be mentioned is that, even though 
this index is constructed from questions unrelated to the issues addressed in the certification document 
(Box 1), because the survey instrument was implemented after the treatment (that is, after the consumers 
had read the intensive information document), spillover effects could be possible for some consumers.  
Table 2. Distribution and factor analysis of statements on food safety and quality KAPP 
Knowledge, attitude, perception, and practice statements 
Rotated factor loadings 
Food safety 
consciousness index 
Statements coded according to the 5-point Likert scale: 
1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neither agree nor disagree, 4. Agree, 5. Strongly agree  
1.  All foodstuff should be organic.  0.4611 
2.  Of all the risks we face today, food safety is rather insignificant.  –0.1968 
3.  Producing safer food is costly.  –0.4242 
4.  I/we never purchase food from street vendors.  0.4768 
5.  I/we always purchase food from the supermarket.  0.4705 
6.  I/we look for nutrition information on processed food when shopping.  0.4718 
7.   I/we buy organic whenever that choice is possible.  0.6094 
8.  I look for organic certification if food is sold as organic.  0.4580 
9.  I buy brown bread.  0.3311 
10.  I buy bottled drinking water.  0.3913 
11.  I/we reduced consumption of cola products after the well-publicized episode 
of excess pesticide residues found in cola products. 
–0.1118 
12.  I/we eat ready-to-eat meals.  –0.0502 
Ranking most and second-most important food attributes  
13.  The most important food characteristic is   
safety   0.1307 
price  –0.2646 
taste  –0.4427 
nutrition  0.3540 
Eigenvalues  2.3699 
Source: Certification Market Experiment, Mumbai 2008.    
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4.3. Econometric Analysis of the Impact of Information on the Demand for Food Safety  
In this section, we use a regression analysis to investigate the impact of the information given to the 
treatment group on consumers’ purchase of food safety-certified grapes. In this analysis, we control for 
various consumer- and household-level characteristics which we hypothesize might affect consumer 
demand for safer food.  We also control for the (relative) price of the labeled grapes, since this was varied 
during the course of the experiment. However, we do not need to control for product attributes such as 
variety, freshness, packaging, and taste since the labeled and unlabeled grapes were identical in these 
attributes. We also control for consumers’ weekly frequency of grape purchase during the grape season, 
as well as the actual quantity of grapes bought during the supermarket visit. Both of these variables could 
have a bearing on consumers’ choice between labeled and unlabeled grapes. Equation (16) is specified as 
a probit regression and two models were estimated: Model 1, which included all the consumer and 
household characteristics mentioned above, and Model 2, which in addition to the above-mentioned 
characteristics also included FSCI described in Section 4.2. The results of these models are presented in 
Table 3. 
In both models, the results reveal that being in the treatment group did have a significant and 
positive impact on consumer demand for the labeled (food safety-certified) product, controlling for 
relative price and several consumer, household, and purchasing characteristics. Both income and years of 
education have a positive impact on consumers’ likelihood of purchasing a safer product, although the 
coefficient on income is insignificant in both models. In addition, in both models, households that 
consume more grapes (both in quantity and in frequency) are more likely to prefer labeled grapes. All of 
these findings are similar to the findings of studies that investigated consumer demand for safer food in 
developed countries. These results are robust across the two models. The addition of FSCI in the second 
model reveals that consumers with higher FSCI are more likely to purchase labeled grapes, as expected. 
It should be noted that these findings are robust to the choice of the model (the same regressions 
were also run using the linear probability model) and also inclusion of income in logarithmic form. 
Finally, the same regressions were also run with price per kilogram of grapes in absolute rather than 
relative terms. We found that absolute price was negative and significant, implying that, as expected, 
consumers are less likely to purchase grapes with higher prices, though this finding did not affect their 
demand for grapes with the food safety certification label if the consumers were in the treatment group. 
These results are presented in Tables A.2–A.7 in the appendix.  
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Table 3. Probit regression on factors that affect the purchase of labeled grapes
a 
Consumer and household 
characteristics 
 









Treatment =1, 0 if control  0.589 (0.189)***  0.129 
(0.043)*** 
0.398 (0.202)**  0.083 
(0.043)** 
Age   –0.004 (0.008)  –0.001 (0.002)  –0.006 (0.008)  –0.001 (0.002) 
Gender =1 if male, 0 otherwise  0.078 (0.205)  0.017 (0.044)  –0.1 (0.209)  0.021 (0.044) 
Share of food expenditure in 
monthly income 
–0.006 (0.005)  –0.001 (0.001)  –0.0005 (0.006)  –0.0001 
(0.001) 
Monthly income (in Rs)  9.08×10
–6 (9.39×10
–6)  1.92×10




Vegetarian =1, 0 otherwise  –0.061 (0.196)  –0.013 (0.041)  –0.006 (0.2)  –0.001 (0.041) 
Price ratio (price labeled/ price 
unlabeled) 
0.822 (0.759)  0.174 (0.16)  0.273 (0.796)  0.056 (0.162) 
Household size  –0.036 (0.059)  –0.008 (0.013)  –0.056 (0.061)  –0.011 (0.012) 
Quantity of grapes bought in 
supermarket visit (in kg) 
0.833 (0.6)*  0.176 (0.118)*  0.76 (0.609)  0.155 (0.116)* 
Weekly frequency of grape 
purchase in season 
0.156 (0.105)*  0.033 (0.022)*  0.24 (0.112)***  0.049 
(0.023)** 
Education (in years)  0.214 (0.109)**  0.045 (0.023)**  0.197 (0.111)*  0.04 (0.023)* 
FSCI   —  —  0.14 (0.05)***  0.029 
(0.01)*** 
Constant  –1.503 (1.281)    –2.184 (1.328)*   
Sample size  296  296 
Log likelihood   –117.453  –113.349 
Chi squared  30.77  38.96 
Degrees of freedom  11  12 
Significance level  0.0012  0.0001 
Correct predictions  87%  88% 
2 ρ   0.1158  0.1466 
Source: Certification Market Experiment, Mumbai 2008.  
Notes:
 a Dependent variable is whether or not the consumer purchased certified grapes (bought certified grapes = 1, 0 otherwise); 
* significant at less than 10%, ** significant at less than 5%, *** significant at less than 1% with two-tailed or one-tailed tests. 
4.4. Impacts of FSCI on Consumer Demand for Safer Food  
The purpose of providing documentation to consumers was to inform them about the credibility of the 
GlobalGAP certification and about what this certification entails in terms of food safety. In all 
randomized experiments in which the marginal effect of provision of information is to be assessed, two 
problems are likely to be faced—i) the prior KAPP pertaining to the subject matter at hand and ii)) the 
disparity between the subjects’ and researchers’ capacity/propensity to process/absorb the information. 
The latter is often difficult to control for when there is only one-off interaction with the subject, as was 
the case in the market experiment presented here. If we had the opportunity to observe multiple purchases 
of the same consumers, we could have conducted a follow-up survey to ascertain the effects of 
information based on the actual absorption and processing of information.   
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To control for the first problem, we use the FSCI introduced in Section 4.2 to segment the 
customers into two groups—one with below-mean FSCI and another with mean and above-mean FSCI. 
Our hypothesis is that the marginal effect of the provision of information regarding credible certification 
on consumer demand for safer product would be higher for the consumers who have higher prior FSCI. 
This is because these customers already have preferences for safer food but may not have been presented 
with credible information and certification that would enable these preferences to materialize. The 
marginal effects of the probit models for customers with above- and below-mean FSCI are presented in 
Table 4. Results show that the marginal effect of credible information and certification is higher for 
customers who have a high FSCI—that is, those consumers who already have knowledge and awareness 
of food safety and perceive it to be important. The results are robust to the use of the median FSCI for this 
segmentation (results available from the authors upon request).  
Table 4. Marginal effects from the probit regression on factors that affect the purchase labeled, 
stratified by FSCI below and above mean
a 
Consumer and household characteristics   FSCI mean and above   FSCI below mean  
Coefficient (standard error) 
Treatment =1, 0 if control  0.218 (0.088)**  0.112 (0.067)* 
Age   0.002 (0.002)  –0.003 (0.003) 
Gender =1 if male, 0 otherwise  0.047 (0.066)  –0.001 (0.074) 
Share of food expenditure in monthly income  –0.002 (0.002)  0.0004 (0.002) 
Monthly income (in Rs)  3.03×10
–6 (0)  2.25×10
–6 (0) 
Vegetarian =1, 0 otherwise  0.043 (0.063)  –0.054 (0.065) 
Price ratio (price labeled/ price unlabeled)  0.251 (0.214)  0.129 (0.29) 
Household size  –0.013 (0.016)  –0.001 (0.023) 
Quantity of grapes bought in supermarket visit (in kg)  —  0.107 (0.156) 
Weekly frequency of grape purchase in season  0.059 (0.032)**  0.049 (0.039) 
Education (in years)  0.066 (0.033)**  0.038 (0.036) 
Sample size  114  159 
Log likelihood   –37.186  –74.87 
Chi squared  18.11  12.65 
 Degrees of freedom  10  11 
Significance level  0.0532  0.3168 
Correct predictions  91%  81.5% 
2 ρ   0.1958  0.0779 
Source: Certification Market Experiment, Mumbai 2008. 
Notes: 
a Dependent variable is whether or not the consumer purchased certified grapes (bought certified grapes = 1, 0 otherwise); 
* significant at less than 10%, ** significant at less than 5%, *** significant at less than 1% with two-tailed tests  
4.5. Caveats and Points for Further Consideration 
Even though the randomization exercise was conducted successfully in shop 2, there are five potential 
caveats and other points about this experiment that should be mentioned. First, despite the random 
allocation of the intensive document, similarly to all information-focused interventions, provision of 
information need not imply uniform digestion of that information.  As discussed previously, identification 
of the marginal effect of the treatment (intensive information regarding credible certification) is  
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challenging for this reason. We have adopted a novel way of controlling for prior knowledge and 
awareness about food safety through the KAPP data collected with the consumer survey instrument. This 
approach is, however, contingent upon the comprehensiveness of the KAPP questions and index 
presented here, and the shortcoming of either could bias the effect of the treatment on the outcome 
(purchase of the labeled product). 
Second, in experiments such as the one presented in this paper, there is always the possibility of 
curiosity bias in consumer choices. A certified fresh fruit in Indian context is akin to a new product or 
brand in the market. Naturally, there could have been some bias in consumer choices because of this 
novelty, especially given the advertisement made with the posters and banners about GlobalGAP-certified 
grapes and the randomly distributed fliers. Had it been possible to implement this experiment over a 
longer period of time, we could have observed several repeat purchases by the same consumer and 
corrected for the issue of curiosity bias. Unfortunately, this was not feasible to the extent that we had 
hoped due to the fact that GlobalGAP-certified food products are limited to fresh fruits (for example, 
grapes and mangoes), which have very short seasons. Over the one-month period during which the 
experiment was implemented, field investigators could track only 68 repeat consumers, of which 79 
percent opted for labeled grapes in their repeat visit.  
Third, for the identification of the effect of information regarding credible certification on 
consumer demand for safer food, first-time choices are more suitable since through spillover (especially 
in a country such as India, which has strong social and information networks), the information would 
become available over time even without the provision of the documentation. To investigate whether a 
spillover of information indeed occurred through the course of the month, we plotted the share of sales of 
labeled grapes to unlabeled ones against time (Figure A.2 in the appendix). Had there been a spillover 
effect during the experiment, we would have seen an increasing trend, which is not evident in Figure A.2. 
Therefore, we can conjecture that there was not a significant spillover effect during the course of the 
experiment. 
Fourth, in this experiment we chose GlobalGAP as the credible certification because we believed 
Indian consumers would have deeper trust in an international third-party certification due to previous food 
safety scandals and lax food safety standards and monitoring in India. However, through the consumer 
survey instrument, we found that when consumers were asked, “Who should certify foodstuff in India?” 
more consumers (39.5 percent) chose the government of India, followed by an international third-party 
certification agency (for example, GlobalGAP) with 30 percent. Therefore, it is likely that had we chosen 
the government of India as the certification authority, we could have observed a higher demand for the 
produce labeled as certified.  
Related to this point, we also found that those who consume grapes more frequently and in higher 
quantities are more likely to prefer the labeled product. We can therefore deduct that had we chosen a 
product consumed more regularly (for example, flour), a higher demand for the safer product could have 
been observed. Finally, again related to the underestimation issue, in this market experiment we selected 
buyers without knowing whether they had visited the supermarket with the intention of buying grapes that 
day. If the consumer switched from not intending to buy grapes to buying grapes labeled as GlobalGAP 
certified, then it is likely that we are underestimating the impact of information and credible certification. 
Finally, it needs to be recognized that the credibility of certification is enmeshed with the 
reputation of the retailer. Unless the consumers trust the supermarket to abide by the claims made (that is, 
that it shelves the true products), the credibility of the certification itself would be jeopardized. This 
justifies our choice of supermarket outlets to implement this experiment, since the fly-by-night nature of 
unorganized retail would not be perceived by the consumers as trustworthy in providing a truly certified 
product.   
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5.  DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, we presented the results of a randomized market experiment conducted in Mumbai, India, 
which hosts one of the world’s fastest growing middle-income populations. The aim of this market 
experiment was to assess the role of credible information and certification on consumer demand for safer 
food in developing countries. Low or nonexistent demand for safer food among consumers in developing 
countries is often explained by consumers’ low ability to pay, though there are few explanations as to why 
those consumers with consistently increasing incomes still exhibit a low demand for safer food. We 
hypothesize that this phenomenon can be explained by the lack of credible information and certification 
prevalent in developing countries; to capture these consumers’ demand for safer food, credible 
information and certification should be provided. 
To test this hypothesis we implemented a market experiment in which we sold grapes with 
credible food safety certification. We divided certified grapes into two groups—one labeled with a 
credible certification (GlobalGAP) and the other with no such label. We shelved these grapes side-by-side 
in two supermarkets located in two neighborhoods of Mumbai—an upper-middle-income neighborhood 
and a lower-middle-income one. During the course of the month in which the experiment took place, we 
provided the customers of these supermarkets with two types of information (extensive and intensive). 
The extensive information comprised banners and posters displayed visibly outside and inside the 
supermarkets and above the shelves of the labeled grapes; these banners informed consumers that 
GlobalGAP-certified fresh grapes were being sold at the supermarket during the grape season. Intensive 
information consisted of a brief document (a user-friendly flier) that introduced GlobalGAP and 
explained what the certification entails in terms of production, postharvest, and handling food safety 
standards. During the course of the experiment, every second customer that entered the supermarkets 
(about one-half of the customers) was selected and presented with the intensive information document. 
Following checkout, customers who purchased grapes of either kind were interviewed with a short survey 
instrument conducted with handheld computers. Those customers who received both the extensive 
information and the intensive information, purchased grapes of either kind, and participated in the 
interview comprise the treatment group in this market experiment; those who received only the extensive 
information, purchased grapes or either kind, and were interviewed made up the control group.  
The comparison of the treatment group’s key characteristics thought to affect demand for safer 
and higher quality food (age, income, and education) with those of the control group confirmed that the 
randomization was successfully implemented in only one of the shops (the one located in the lower-
middle-income neighborhood). Consequently, we analyzed the data from the supermarket in which 
randomization was successful. Our findings revealed that consumers in the treatment group are more 
likely to purchase grapes that have food safety certification labels. Further, consumers’ answers to various 
knowledge, attitude, perception and practices (KAPP) questions collected through the survey instrument 
were condensed into a consumer-specific food safety consciousness index (FSCI) with the use of the 
factor analysis method. Our aim in creating this index was to understand the impact of the treatment 
conditional on consumers’ prior food safety KAPP. We used the mean FSCI value to stratify the sample 
into two segments—consumers with low FSCI (FSCI below mean) and those with high FSCI (FSCI mean 
and above). We found that the impact of the intensive information on those consumers with high FSCI 
was greater than the impact of the same on consumers with low FSCI. This result reinforces our argument 
that credible information and certification are the missing ingredients for capturing consumer demand for 
safer food in many developing countries. 
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APPENDIX 
A.1. Derivation of the Indirect Utility Function 
Let the ordinal utility function of a consumer be defined as 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑥,𝑛,𝐻),   (A.1) 
where 𝑥 and 𝑛  denote the consumption of the non-numeriaire and the numeraire goods, respectively. 
Note that the expression in equation (A.1) implies that health is viewed as a well-defined “commodity” 
(see Johanson 1995). It also implies that a consumer is able to collapse different attributes of health into a 
single variable. Moreover, the health status of the consumer is treated as given. In this paper, the expected 
health status will be different across certified and noncertified product. The individual maximizes utility 
subject to a budget constraint. This gives the demand function for good 𝑥 as 
𝑥 = 𝑥(𝑝,1,𝐻).   (A.2) 
Substituting this into the direct utility function in equation (A.1), we get  
𝑉 = 𝑉(𝑝,1,𝑀,𝐻) = 𝑈(𝑥(𝑝,1,𝐻),𝐻).   (A.3) 
The indirect utility function is specified as a function of prices, income, and expected health.  
A.2. Choice of Certified over Noncertified Product  
Consumer 𝑖 prefers a certified product over the noncertified one if  
𝑉𝑖�𝐻𝑐 
𝑖 ,𝑝 + ∆𝑝𝑖,𝑠,𝑀𝑖� > 𝑉𝑖�𝐻𝑛𝑐 
𝑖 ,𝑝,𝑠,𝑀𝑖�.   (A.4) 
Taking a linear expansion around the point of indifference and using equation (3), we get 
𝑑𝑉𝑖 = −𝑉 𝑝(∆𝑝𝑖
∗ − ∆𝑝𝑖).   (A.5) 
Equation (A.5) implies that certified product is bought if ∆𝑝𝑖
∗ > ∆𝑝𝑖. 
A.3. Change in Willingness to Pay a Premium as Income of an Individual Rises 
Further, let us generically define a characteristic of the consumer (such as education or income) or 
product attribute other than food safety (such as price level) that could affect the maximum possible 









2) ∆𝐻𝑖  (A.6) 
Proposition 1: At the margin, the effect of increased income for individual 𝑖 on the maximum 
premium that a consumer is willing to pay is ambiguous. 
Proof: To see this, let us change 𝑘𝑖in equation (A.6) to 𝑀𝑖, the income of consumer 𝑖. Equation 








2) ∆𝐻𝑖.   (A.6’) 
In equation (A.6’) the sign of 𝑉𝐻𝑀𝑖 is unknown. The term is the change in marginal utility of 
health with income that could be signed atheoretically; that is, there is no theoretical basis for it to be  
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positive or negative. For the sign of 𝑉𝑝𝑀𝑖: from Roy’s identity, 𝑉 𝑝 = −𝑉 𝑚𝑥 where 𝑥 is the Marshallian 
demand. Thus,  
𝑉 𝑝𝑚 = −[𝑉 𝑚
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑚 + 𝑥𝑉 𝑚𝑚].   (A.7)
3
Assuming normal good, the first expression within parentheses on the right-hand side of equation 
(A.7) is unambiguously positive. With diminishing returns to income, 𝑉 𝑚𝑚 < 0. Hence, the sign of 𝑉𝑝𝑀𝑖 is 
ambiguous. Dahlby (1981) has shown that the expression in equation (A.7) can be rewritten as  
 
𝜃 = 𝑠(𝑟 − 𝜂),   (A.7’) 
where 𝜃 is the elasticity of marginal utility of income with respect to price (note that the sign of the 
elasticity is the same as the sign of 𝑉 𝑝𝑚), 𝑠 is the budget share of the commodity, 𝜂 is the income 
elasticity of demand, and 𝑟 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (defined as the negative of the 
marginal utility of income with respect to income). Hence, whether the sign of 𝑉 𝑝𝑚 is positive or negative 
depends on the relative magnitude of 𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜂.  
Proposition 2: Assuming marginal utility of expected health varies positively with income, the 
consumer is willing to pay a higher premium for food safety only if (𝑟 > 𝜂). 
Proof: If (𝑟 > 𝜂), based on the relationship in equation (A.7’), 𝑉 𝑝𝑚 is positive. Plugging back 
into equation (A.6’), 
𝜕∆𝑝𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑀𝑖 is greater than zero. If there is increasing relative risk aversion (𝑟 is larger for 
wealthier individuals), then small increases in income for wealthier consumers should result in greater 
maximum possible premium for certification from them. Hence, as incomes have risen in India, the WTP 
(willingness to pay) a higher premium for each individual will become more likely if the condition in 
proposition 2 is satisfied.  
Note the role of credibility inherent in equation (A.6’) as consumer income rises. As long as 
∆𝐻𝑖 > 0 and the condition in proposition 2 is satisfied, the maximum possible premium for certification 
will rise with income for each individual. However, the magnitude of ∆𝐻𝑖 determines the size of the 
premium, which is a function of credibility of certification.  
   
                                                       
3 𝑉 𝑚𝑝 (the change in marginal utility of income with price) was derived as in equation (A.7) in 1942 by Samuelson. By 
Young’s theorem, 𝑉 𝑚𝑝 = 𝑉 𝑝𝑚..  
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Table A.1. Prices (in rupees) of labeled and unlabeled grapes offered on different dates  
Date  Shop 1  Shop 2 
Labeled grapes  
(price Rs/kg) 
Unlabeled grapes  
(price Rs/kg) 
Labeled grapes  
(price Rs/kg) 
Unlabeled grapes  
(price Rs/kg) 
       
2/27/2008  60  40  60  50 
2/28/2008  60  40  60  50 
2/29/2008  54  40  50  40 
3/1/2008  54  40  30  20 
3/2/2008  54  40  40  30 
3/3/2008  54  40  40  30 
3/4/2008  54  40  44  30 
3/5/2008  46  38  42  30 
3/6/2008  46  38  44  30 
3/8/2008  70  50  60  50 
3/9//2008  70  60  60  50 
3/10/2008  64  56  56  44 
3/11/2008  64  56  56  44 
3/12/2008  62  54  56  44 
3/13/2008  62  54  52  42 
3/14/2008  62  54  52  42 
3/16/2008  60  50  56  48 
3/17/2008  60  50  56  48 
3/18/2008  58  50  54  48 
3/19/2008  58  50  54  48 
3/20/2008  58  48  54  46 
3/21/2008  58  48  54  46 
3/23/2008  60  56  56  50 
3/25/2008  60  56  56  50 
3/26/2008  60  54  54  48 
3/27/2008  60  54  54  48 
3/28/2008  56  50  52  46 
Source: Compiled by authors.  
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Figure A.1. Short document on GlobalGAP certification (English version) 
 
Source: Compiled by authors.  
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Box A.1. Results of the Roy et al. (2010) choice experiment study on consumer demand for safer 
and higher quality food in developing countries 





Attribute definition   Attribute levels 
Taste   Level of sweetness of the grape at the time of purchase  Very sweet,  sweet, and  not so sweet 
Production 
method 
The level of use of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides and 
plant growth regulators 
Organic production, semiorganic production,  
and nonorganic production 
GlobalGAP 
certification 
A Global certification of Good Agricultural Practices 
(GAP) 
Certified vs. noncertified  
Source of 
produce 
Indicator of the length of supply chain and, hence, 
freshness 
Direct from the farmer vs. not direct from the 
farmer 
Price   Price of one kg of grapes in rupees  Rs 30–40, Rs 50, Rs 60–70 
By using experimental design methods (see Louviere et al. 2000), these attributes and levels 
were grouped into 24 pairwise comparisons of grape profiles; each consumer was presented with six 
randomly selected choice sets, each of which contained two grape profiles and the decision to “opt out” 
by selecting neither of the grape profiles presented.  Please see below for an example of these choice 
sets. 
Assuming that the following two grapes were the ONLY choices you have, which one would you 
prefer to buy? 
Grape Characteristics  Grape A  Grape B   
I like neither grape  A nor 
grape B:  
Given these two options, I 
will NOT purchase grapes in 
this supermarket visit 
 
TASTE  Very sweet   Not so sweet  
PRODUCTION METHOD  Organic  Non-organic 
GLOBALGAP 
CERTIFICATION  
Certified  Not certified 
SOURCE OF PRODUCE  Not direct from the farmer  Direct from the farmer 
PRICE PER KG   Rs. 40  Rs. 30 
I prefer to buy      Grape A……     Grape B…….    Neither…… 
Source: Compiled by authors.  
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Box A.1. Continued 
    Conditional logit model (CLM) regressions were estimated separately for the two shops since the 
clientele of the two supermarkets have different income and education levels; therefore, it is 
hypothesized that they have different preferences for grape attributes. In both models, the alternative 
specific constant (ASC) is positive and significant, implying that consumers are more likely to 
choose one of the grape alternatives presented to them rather than the status quo. Moreover, for the 
clientele of both stores, price is an insignificant determinant of grape choice, though the sign is 
negative as expected. This can be due to the small differences in the price level (maximum of 40 Rs) 
which might not be important for customers purchasing fresh grapes one month a year, especially in 
a hypothetical setting. The ranking of the attributes across the two stores is different in shop 1, where 
the most important determinant of grape choice is taste (sweetness), followed by whether or not the 
grape has GlobalGAP certification. In shop 2, on the other hand, the ranking of these two attributes 
is reversed. Surprisingly, the shop 2 customers, who have lower education levels and incomes than 
their counterparts in shop 1, reveal stronger preferences for certified grapes. One possible 
explanation for this is that given their lower income levels, households in this area might be more 
exposed to food safety risks and are therefore more wary of consequences from a lapse in food safety 
standards. Certification offers them an opportunity to access safer food, which, owing to their 
experiences, they might value more. Customers in shop 2 disclose strong preferences for organically 
produced grapes, as organic production ranks right below taste attributes; semiorganic production 
attribute is insignificant. Shop 1 consumers also rank organic production highly; this is followed by 
semiorganic grapes. These results are presented below. 
Grape attributes  Shop 1  Shop 2 
  Coefficient (standard error) 
ASC  1.607  (0.145)***  1.631 (0.190)*** 
Sweet taste  0.428 (0.032)***  0.342 (0.041)*** 
Very sweet taste  0.350 (0.036)***  0.286 (0.047)*** 
Semiorganic production  0.163 (0.037)***  0.054 (0.046) 
Organic production  0.332 (0.037)***  0.227 (0.048)*** 
Direct from farmer  0.097 (0.039)***  0.124 (0.051)** 
GlobalGAP certified  0.414 (0.035)***  0.414 (0.045)*** 
Price  –0.001 (0.003)  –0.0003 (0.004) 
2 ρ   0.149  0.161 
Log-likelihood  –3204.986  –1897.56 
Sample size  3426  2058 
Source:  Compiled by authors.  
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Table A.2. Model 1 on Table 3 with income in logarithmic form* 
Iteration 5: log likelihood     = -117.44587  
Probit regression:                    
Number of obs                      =  296 
LR chi2(11)                           =  30.76 
Prob > chi2                            =  0.0012 
Log likelihood                       =  -117.44587                        
Pseudo R2                             =  0.1158 
certbuy  Coef  Std. Err.        z      P>|z|       [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
treatmt  .591243     .1884508       3.14  0.002       .2218862      .9605998 
age  -.0045623    .0076824      -0.59  0.553      -.0196196       .010495 
male  .0830222    .2052528       0.40  0.686      -.3192658      .4853102 
ExpendShare  -.0060313    .0052103      -1.16  0.247      -.0162433      .0041808 
ln_income  .1709042    .1740909       0.98  0.326      -.1703078      .5121161 
Vegetarian  -.0531925    .1952711      -0.27  0.785      -.4359168      .3295317 
priceratio  .8348537    .7598826       1.10  0.272      -.6544889      2.324196 
hhsize  -.0353167      .059377      -0.59  0.552      -.1516935      .0810602 
KgGrBought  .836662     .6004865       1.39  0.164      -.3402698      2.013594 
HowOftenBu~r  .1557229    .1048455       1.49  0.137      -.0497705      .3612162 
Education  .2132515      .108822       1.96  0.050      -.0000356      .4265387 
cons  -3.009496    2.098503      -1.43  0.152      -7.122487      1.103495 
Source:  Compiled by authors. 
Notes on abbreviations of variable names: Certbuy- binary variable equals 1 if buys certified product; Ln_income- log of income; 
HowOftenBu~r – How often in a week the consumer buys grapes during the grape season. 
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Table A.3. Model 2 on Table 3 with income in logarithmic form 
Iteration 5: log likelihood     = -113.23576  
Probit regression 
Number of obs                      =  296 
LR chi2(12)                           =  39.19 
Prob > chi2                            =  0.0001 
Log likelihood                       =  -113.23576                        
Pseudo R2                             =  0.1475 
certbuy  Coef.     Std. Err.       z      P>|z|       [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
treatmt  .3948167    .2026558      1.95     0.051      -.0023815     .7920148 
age  -.0062859    .0078011     -0.81     0.420      -.0215758       .009004 
male  .1076777  .209967      0.51     0.608      -.3038501     .5192055 
ExpendShare  -.0004688    .0056836     -0.08     0.934      -.0116085     .0106709 
ln_income  .145669     .1805157      0.81     0.420      -.2081353     .4994734 
Vegetarian  -.0002932    .1997478     -0.00     0.999      -.3917916     .3912052 
priceratio  .2910675    .7958351      0.37     0.715      -1.268741     1.850876 
hhsize  -.0562502    .0605349     -0.93     0.353      -.1748964     .0623959 
KgGrBought  .7566634    .6071965      1.25     0.213      -.4334199     1.946747 
HowOftenBu~r  .2423178    .1121575      2.16     0.031       .0224933     .4621424 
Education  .1881153    .1119527      1.68     0.093      -.0313079     .4075385 
fscinew  .1412662    .0495168      2.85     0.004        .044215  .2383174 
cons  -3.487118    2.168074     -1.61     0.108      -7.736465     .7622299 
Source:  Compiled by authors. 
Notes on abbreviations of variable names: Certbuy- binary variable equals 1 if buys certified product; Ln_income- log of income; 
HowOftenBu~r – How often in a week the consumer buys grapes during the grape season. 
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Table A.4. Model 1 on Table 3 estimated using linear probability model 
Number of obs  =   296 
F( 11,   284)        =   2.78 
Prob > F             =  0.0019 
R-squared          =  0.0972 
Adj R-squared  =  0.0622 
Root MSE          =  .36053 
Source  SS         df         MS               
Model  3.97280392      11  .361163993 
Residual  36.9157096     284  .129984893            
Total  40.8885135     295  .138605131            
 
certbuy  Coef.     Std. Err.        t      P>|t|       [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
treatmt  .1376676     .0429365       3.21     0.001       .0531534      .2221819 
age  -
.0010472    
.0017669      -0.59     0.554       -.004525      .0024306 
male  .0116418     .0456957       0.25     0.799      -.0783034       .101587 
ExpendShare  -
.0014805    
.0011922      -1.24     0.215      -.0038271      .0008661 
IncomeRp  2.34e-06     2.09e-06       1.12     0.264      -1.78e-06      6.47e-06 
Vegetarian  -.011986     .0443487      -0.27     0.787      -.0992798      .0753078 
priceratio  .137052      .168605       0.81     0.417       -.194822       .468926 
hhsize  -
.0112154    
.0141039      -0.80     0.427      -.0389768      .0165461 
KgGrBought  .0636691      .040772       1.56     0.119      -.0165845      .1439226 
HowOftenBu~r  .0368637     .0237105       1.55     0.121      -.0098069      .0835343 
Education  .0547607     .0255211       2.15     0.033       .0045261      .1049953 
_cons  .3614129     .2876122       1.26     0.210      -.2047091       .927535 
Source:  Compiled by authors. 
Notes on abbreviations of variable names: Certbuy- binary variable equals 1 if buys certified product; Ln_income- log of income; 
HowOftenBu~r – How often in a week the consumer buys grapes during the grape season. 
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Table A.5. Model 2 on Table 3 estimated using linear probability model 
Number of obs   =   296 
F( 12,   283)         =   3.34 
Prob > F              =  0.0001 
R-squared           =  0.1241 
Adj R-squared   =  0.0870 
Root MSE           =  .35574 
Source  SS         df         MS               
Model            5.07440957             12    .422867464            
Residual            35.8141039            283    .126551604            
Total            40.8885135            295    .138605131            
 
certbuy  Coef.  Std. Err.        t      P>|t|  [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
treatmt  .0921949     .0450821       2.05     0.042       .0034561      .1809337 
age  -.0014978     .0017501      -0.86     0.393      -.0049426       .001947 
male  .0213821     .0452089       0.47     0.637      -.0676062      .1103704 
ExpendShare  -.0000593     .0012711      -0.05     0.963      -.0025614      .0024428 
IncomeRp  1.69e-06     2.08e-06       0.81     0.418      -2.40e-06      5.78e-06 
Vegetarian  -.0004193     .0439343      -0.01     0.992      -.0868989      .0860602 
priceratio  .0273493     .1704679       0.16     0.873      -.3081967      .3628953 
hhsize  -.0147716     .0139685      -1.06     0.291       -.042267      .0127237 
KgGrBought  .0594441     .0402554       1.48     0.141      -.0197939       .138682 
HowOftenBu~r  .0561466      .024291       2.31     0.022       .0083326      .1039606 
Education  .0483568     .0252752       1.91     0.057      -.0013945      .0981081 
fscinew  .032098     .0108792       2.95     0.003       .0106835      .0535125 
_cons  .1725364     .2909194       0.59     0.554      -.4001041       .745177 
Source:  Compiled by authors. 
Notes on abbreviations of variable names: Certbuy- binary variable equals 1 if buys certified product; Ln_income- log of income; 
HowOftenBu~r – How often in a week the consumer buys grapes during the grape season. 
    
  32 
Table A.6. Model 1 on Table 3 with price of kg of grape in absolute form 
Iteration 5: log likelihood     = -111.70145 
Probit regression 
Number of obs                      =  298 
LR chi2(11)                           =  49.38 
Prob > chi2                            =  0.0000 
Log likelihood                       =  -111.70145                        
Pseudo R2                             =  0.1810 
certbuy  Coef.     Std. Err.            z      P>|z|       [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
treatmt  .6678787     .1948722       3.43     0.001       .2859363      1.049821 
age  -.0079582     .0079886      -1.00     0.319      -.0236156      .0076991 
male  -.01376     .2124725      -0.06     0.948      -.4301985      .4026785 
ExpendShare  -.0073825     .0053967      -1.37     0.171      -.0179599      .0031948 
IncomeRp  7.77e-07     9.57e-06       0.08     0.935       -.000018      .0000195 
Vegetarian  .0376803     .2041262       0.18     0.854      -.3623997      .4377603 
priceperkggr   -69.1907     17.17698      -4.03     0.000       -102.857   -35.52444 
hhsize  -.0248377     .0615575      -0.40     0.687      -.1454881      .0958128 
KgGrBought  3.625692      .908648       3.99     0.000       1.844775       5.40661 
HowOftenBu~r  .0836107     .1090348       0.77     0.443      -.1300936      .2973151 
Education  .1693664     .1124613       1.51     0.132      -.0510536      .3897864 
cons  .1958565     .7580133       0.26     0.796      -1.289822      1.681535 
Marginal effects after probit:  
y  = Pr(certbuy) (predict) 
    =  .89494674 
variable   dy/dx      Std. Err.         z              P>|z|    [95% C.I. ]    X 
treatmt*  .1274085        .03954      3.22     0.001     .049916    .204901     .54698 
age  -.0014476  .00144     -1.00     0.316    -.004278    .001383    46.5356 
male*  -.0024969        .03847     -0.06     0.948    -.077898    .072904     .64094 
Expend~e  -.0013429        .00098     -1.37     0.172    -.003268    .000583    39.4253 
IncomeRp  1.41e-07        .00000      0.08     0.935    -3.3e-06    3.6e-06    25100.7 
Vegetarian  .0068541        .03714      0.18     0.854    -.065933    .079641     1.3557 
Price~gr  -12.58596       2.67767     -4.70     0.000    -17.8341  -7.33783    .024215 
hhsize  -.004518        .01121     0.40     -0.687    -.026499    .017463    3.73826 
KgGrBo~t  .6595224        .13459      4.90     0.000     .395722    .923323    .620805 
HowOft~r  .015209        .02003      0.76     0.448    -.024053    .054471    2.21477 
Educat~n  .0308082        .02064      1.49     0.136    -.009646    .071262    3.68456 
Source:  Compiled by authors. 
Notes on abbreviations of variable names: Certbuy- binary variable equals 1 if buys certified product; Ln_income- log of income; 
HowOftenBu~r – How often in a week the consumer buys grapes during the grape season. 
Note: 0 failures and 3 successes completely determined. (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
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Table A.7. Model 2 on Table 3 with price of kg of grapes in absolute form 
Iteration 5: log likelihood     = -108.72156 
Probit regression 
Number of obs                      =  298 
LR chi2(12)                           =  55.34 
Prob > chi2                            =  0.0000 
Log likelihood                       =  -108.72156                        
Pseudo R2                             =  0.2029 
certbuy  Coef.     Std. Err.           z      P>|z|       [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
treatmt  .5278182     .2047419       2.58     0.010       .1265314      .9291049 
age  -.0095895        .0080816      -1.19     0.235      -.0254292      .0062501 
male  .0174791     .2153597       0.08     0.935      -.4046182      .4395764 
ExpendShare  -.0029942     .0057802      -0.52     0.604      -.0143232      .0083348 
IncomeRp  -1.01e-06     9.76e-06      -0.10     0.918      -.0000201      .0000181 
Vegetarian  .0760256     .2074489       0.37     0.714      -.3305669       .482618 
priceperkggr  -69.50971     17.45437      -3.98     0.000      -103.7197     -35.29978 
hhsize  -.0420182     .0622958      -0.67     0.500      -.1641156      .0800792 
KgGrBought  3.597998  .9186062       3.92     0.000       1.797563      5.398433 
HowOftenBu~r  .1549499     .1151742       1.35     0.179      -.0707874      .3806872 
Education  .1567354     .1143644       1.37     0.171      -.0674146      .3808854 
fscinew  .112263     .0464919       2.41     0.016       .0211407  .2033854 
cons  -.9333452     .8934416      -1.04     0.296      -2.684459      .8177682 
Marginal effects after probit:  
y  = Pr(certbuy) (predict) 
    =  .89850169 
variable   dy/dx      Std. Err.          z              P>|z|    [95% C.I. ]    X 
treatmt*  .0972257        .03939      2.47     0.014     .020019    .174432     .54698 
age  -.0017013        .00143     -1.19        0.233    -.004496    .001093    46.5356 
male*  .0031108        .03844      0.08     0.935    -.072228     .07845     .64094 
Expend~e  -.0005312        .00102     -0.52     0.603    -.002535    .001472    39.4253 
IncomeRp  -1.79e-07        .00000     -0.10     0.918    -3.6e-06    3.2e-06    25100.7 
Vegetarian  .0134879        .03684      0.37     0.714     -.05871    .085686          1.3557 
Price~gr  -12.33187       2.67894     -4.60     0.000    -17.5825  -7.08124    .024215 
hhsize  -.0074545        .01109     -0.67     0.501    -.029182    .014273    3.73826 
KgGrBo~t  .6383284        .13454      4.74     0.000     .374643    .902014    .620805 
HowOft~r  .02749              .02086      1.32     0.188    -.013403    .068383    2.21477 
Educat~n  .0278068        .02046      1.36     0.174    -.012299    .067913    3.68456 
fscinew  .0199168         .0085      2.34     0.019     .003256    .036577    9.61127 
Source:  Compiled by authors. 
Notes on abbreviations of variable names: Certbuy- binary variable equals 1 if buys certified product; Ln_income- log of income; 
HowOftenBu~r – How often in a week the consumer buys grapes during the grape season. 
Note: 0 failures and 3 successes completely determined. (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.    
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Figure A.2. Share of sales of labeled to unlabeled grapes throughout the month  
 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
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